“A Key Judgment on Interim Maintenance For a Child Under the Inheritance (Provision For Family and Dependents) Ordinance”
15 Aug 2024
In May 2023, a 14-year-old boy (A), through his mother as the next friend (M), applied for financial provision out of his deceased father’s estate pursuant to s.3(1)(v) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Ordinance, Cap. 481 (“IPFDO”). She then applied for interim maintenance (“IM”) pursuant to s.7 IPFDO.
This application was one of the first interlocutory applications heard in the Family Court following the introduction of the new Masters System, whereby Family Court Masters have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory applications. Any appeals against their decisions will be heard by a Family Court Judge, the nature of appeals is a hearing de novo.
The application was originally dismissed by the Master on 6 October 2023, as the learned Master was not satisfied that A was in immediate need for financial assistance. She appealed against this decision together with an application to adduce further evidence on appeal. On appeal, A sought IM under the following heads: private accommodation, domestic helper, and other personal expenses (including but not limited to extra tuition and ECA).
In December 2023, A’s appeal was heard by His Honour Judge C. K. Chan, and is one of the very first appeals against a Family Court Master.
A’s appeal was successful, and her application to adduce further evidence was granted. She is granted IM at HK$7,200 per month.
The Appeal Judgment provides important insights on the following:
Legal principles applicable to a claim for IM under the IPFDO;
A’s immediate financial needs and available financial resources;
The welfare of a minor ought to be considered in IM applications under IPFDO; and
How will a Winnie Lo fee arrangement be viewed in the Family Court.
Legal principles applicable to an Interim Maintenance claim under IPFDO
The IPFDO was introduced to replace the now-repealed Deceased’s Family Maintenance Ordinance (“DFMO”) upon the Law Reform Commission’s recommendation. It continues the spirit of the DFMO to provide a safety net for close relatives who have not received reasonable financial provision for the purpose of maintenance from the deceased’s estate.
A’s claim for interim maintenance is based on s.7 of the IPFDO. Section 7(1) IPFDO reads:
Where on an application for an order under section 4 it appears to the court –
(a) that the applicant is in immediate need of financial assistance, but it is not yet possible to determine what order (if any) should be made under that section; and
(b) that property forming part of the net estate of the deceased is or can be made available to meet the need of the applicant,
the court may order that, subject to such conditions or restrictions, if any, as the court may impose and to any further order of the court, there shall be paid to the applicant out of the net estate of the deceased such sum or sums and (if more than one) at such intervals as the court thinks reasonable; and the court may order that, subject to this Ordinance, such payments are to be made until such date as the court may specify, not being later than the date on which the court either makes an order under section 4 or decides not to exercise its powers under that section.
Given the limited number of IPFDO cases in Hong Kong, case laws on IM for IPFDO are also limited, in particular, those concerning a minor child who was dependent upon the Deceased.
At §29 of the Judgment, the learned Judge took the opportunity to clarify the legal principles applicable in deciding interim maintenance claims under the IPFDO. In summary, it is a 3-stage test:
In the sub-section, there are 2 pre-requisites for an IM application, namely that the applicant must be in immediate need of financial assistance, and that the estate is in a position to meet such needs of the applicant. Only with satisfaction of these 2 pre-requisites, then the court would consider whether to exercise its discretion in granting such an IM order in view of all the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it is a 3-stage test, namely:
(1) Whether the applicant has any immediate financial needs.
(2) If yes, whether the estate is in a position to meet those needs.
(3) If yes again, then the court would consider whether to exercise its discretion in granting such an IM order in view of all the circumstances of the case.
He went on to confirm the definition of “immediate financial needs” as “something which calls for immediate action“, adopting the definition by Lam JA in ACLS v HSB(T)L [2013] 2 HKLRD 444.
It is anticipated that going forward, a similar 3-stage test will be deployed in deciding IM claims under the IPFDO.
What are A’s immediate financial needs?
The learned Judge disallowed A’s claim for private housing and domestic helper on the basis that they are faced with challenges on practicality. Nonetheless he found that A had immediate financial needs. The estate is in a position to meet those needs, and this is a “clear case for this court to exercise its discretion in granting an IM order in favour of A, and the only issue is how much” (at §61).
The learned Judge considered A’s immediate financial needs total HK$9,708. They include care home residential fees (HK$1,500), extra-curricular activities (HK$2,500), meals out of home (HK$600), mobile data plan (HK$138), holidays (HK$200), school lunches and pocket money (HK$1,200), and other miscellaneous expenses. Extra tuition, which the deceased had provided to A before he passed away, forms part of A’s immediate financial needs (HK$2,720).
A’s net immediate financial needs is reduced by some leftover funds in A’s DSWI account, which can be used to meet his care home expenses, to HK$8,208.
What are the resources available to A?
While M does have some financial resources available to her, it is important to look at the bigger picture. M is earning a salary of HK$4,730 with HK$1,196 for food allowance. She is spending HK$900 on herself per month only. While she is maintaining her elder son, the resources saved from her expenses on her older son are not enough, nor should it be diverted to be used on A. It is reasonable for her to continue to retain a little more financial resources for her own use, if an IM order is made against the estate. M’s plot of land in the Philippines could not be sold or liquidated within a short period of time to meet A’s immediate needs. Considering the bigger picture, M is ordered to contribute HK$1,000 to A’s IM.
Furthermore, the estate has sufficient liquid assets, which can be used to meet A’s immediate financial needs.
It was also argued, inter alia, that A had no immediate needs as he had access to public assistance in the form of CSSA and that as the Applicant was able to retain counsel, he must not have access to other source of funds. The learned Judge rejected such arguments.
The net immediate financial needs of A amount to HK$8,208 per month, and it is reasonable for M to contribute HK$1,000 towards that sum. Bearing in mind the size of the estate, the learned Judge ordered the estate to pay HK$7,200 per month as IM for A.
Welfare of the minor
The judgment concluded with the following remark, emphasising the importance in protecting A’s welfare (at §63):
“… I have to remind myself that we are now dealing with the welfare of a minor, who has lost the care and long term financial support of his father. His whole life was turned upside down due to no fault of his. He was required to stay in an institution as compared to a normal home which he used to enjoy during the lifetime of his father. Therefore, it is important that a reasonable IM order should be put in place so as to minimise the adverse impact on A due to the death of and the cessation of financial support from the Deceased.”
Fee arrangements and Winnie Lo
A special feature in this case is that A is not legally aided, unlike most applicants for financial assistance with very limited means. A’s solicitors are charging on a Winnie Lo basis, pursuant to which they will look to the Respondent for a favourable costs order.
Such fee arrangement was discussed in detail in the case of Winnie Lo v HKSAR (2012) 15 HKCFAR 16-71, in which the Defendant, a solicitor in Hong Kong, agreed to take on a personal injury case on the basis that she would look to the other party for costs. In the decision, the CFA confirmed that:
“It was not maintenance or champerty for a solicitor to agree to act in litigation without charge or for a reduced amount in any event or whether the solicitor agrees to look to a hoped-for favourable costs order against the other side to recover his ordinary costs and disbursements. This applied equally to cases where the solicitor took the burden of paying the client’s disbursements in the hope of recovering them from the other side, subject to the cause of action or defence being reasonable and the absence of champerty.”
In the current case, the Respondent complained that since M was able to engage Counsel in all these proceedings, she must have been able to provide for the legal fees. The learned Judge accepted that charging on a Winnie Lo basis is perfectly acceptable under the current legal framework in Hong Kong. No adverse inference was drawn against A or M. This is despite the fact that M had Counsel appearing on her behalf.
The Respondent’s complaint likely stems from the practice for solicitors to collect costs on account before briefing Counsel. Whilst such practice is common, it does not imply that the lay client has a direct liability to pay Counsel’s fees.
Pursuant to The Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct Volume 1, Chapter 12, Commentary 12.04, “in the absence of reasonable excuse a solicitor is personally liable as a matter of professional conduct for the payment of a barrister’s proper fees.”
Accordingly, if a practising solicitor decides to charge the client on a Winnie Lo basis and does not secure costs on account before briefing Counsel, the solicitor will be personally liable to pay Counsel fees. The fact that Counsel is briefed under a Winnie Lo fee arrangement therefore does not automatically imply that the client must have provided costs on account for the same. Nor does it imply the client must be unable to substantiate their claim for financial assistance.
Winnie Lo versus other options for legal costs assistance
Those who constantly go in and out of the Family Court will not be unfamiliar with this story:
Following a painful separation or the loss of a loved one, a dependent was suddenly cut out of all financial resources. On a seemingly peaceful afternoon, they were locked out of their own house, and all access to bank accounts and credit cards were stopped.
They belatedly realised that they had been brutally betrayed by their once-family.
With young children to feed and bills to pay, they have no available funds to start a litigation. They felt helpless against the bullying from the financially stronger party, and were completely at their mercy.
More often than not, lay clients in such a position would find themselves in one of the following scenarios:
They would apply for and be granted legal aid. Their litigation outcome will be subject to the Legal Aid First Charge, meaning that Legal Aid will have the first bite of the final award to pay off the legal fees incurred in the proceedings, with the balance to be released to the aided person.
They would not be entitled to legal aid. If they are fortunate enough to find a law firm willing to start a case for them without adequate costs on account, they would most likely bring a litigation funding application right away against the estate or the breadwinner, asking for the other side to fund their litigation.
In the very rare scenario, they might be able to find a law firm willing to act pro bono.
If none of the above happens, they might decide to act in person.
Without going into the details of the pros and cons of all the above options, we believe we share the following sentiments with our fellow practitioners:
The Legal Aid Department has an astonishing workload. An application for legal aid could easily take 2-3 months to process, which leaves a large window for the other side to take unfair litigation advantage that might be very difficult to rectify.
Litigation funding applications, whilst convenient, are inherently subject to litigation risks. It is subject to a high burden of proof, and a litigant may or may not get enough litigation funding to carry on all that is necessary to conduct their case in the best way possible. Practically speaking, this creates a situation that is often unfair to the receiving party, not only because they are at the mercy of the paying party to make payments on time, but also because they only have “that much to spend” a month, whilst the paying party will often have more available funds to cater for their litigation needs.
Pro bono arrangements in essence removes the potential costs liability of the opposing party and reduces incentive to settle. Such arrangement is therefore most commonly seen in public law litigation and is seldom suitable for contested matrimonial and IPFDO matters.
We also add that there is no direct authority that the Currey test for litigation funding in divorce suits is directly applicable for IM applications under the IPFDO.
With the current Judgment confirming that a Winnie Lo fee arrangement will not necessarily jeopardize a dependant’s claim for financial assistance, the legal profession would be afforded with another option to assist distressed claimants with a genuine case.
Arguably, a Winnie Lo fee arrangement can, to a certain extent, rectify the embarrassing situation of a party receiving litigation funding where their hands are often tied as to how they can strategically plan for their litigation. A Winnie Lo fee arrangement puts the litigation risks back to the financially more capable party – they will have to constantly be aware of their potential costs liability, and make sure they take a reasonable litigation approach and make concessions where necessary, lest they face a big bill from their opponent who has managed to obtain costs against them at the end of the proceedings. (Of course, taxation proceedings will be able to ensure that a fair costs assessment is given.) Solicitors acting on a Winnie Lo basis will also have the incentive to make sure their clients have a good case in order to aim for a favourable costs order. In Family Court cases where emotions are heightened and litigants are sometimes less rational than they would like to be, this might be a good tool to remind all parties to act reasonably with an aim to reduce as much unnecessary conflict as possible.
In Ladd v London Road Car Co Times Newspaper (1900) LT Jo 80, Lord Russell of Killowen LCJ commented that:-
“…it was perfectly consistent with the highest honour to take up a speculative action in this sense – viz, that if a solicitor heard of an injury to a client and honestly took pains to inform himself whether there was a bona fide cause of action, it was consistent with the honour of the profession that the solicitor should take up the action. It would be an evil thing if there were no solicitors to take up such cases, because there was in this country no machinery by which the wrongs of the humbler classes could be vindicated. Law was an expensive luxury, and justice would very often not be done if there were no professional men to take up their cases and take the chance of ultimate payment; but this was on the supposition that the solicitor had honestly satisfied himself by careful inquiry that an honest case existed.”
We agree. We have been taught since Law School that it is basic human rights for all to have equal access to justice. Yet, in the practical world, this is easier said than done. With the current Judgment accepting a Winnie Lo fee arrangement in the Family Court context, we hope this will provide more incentive for practitioners to provide assistance to those who are desperately in need, knowing that they will be able to recover their costs from the opponent as long as they have a good case.
Takeaway
This is the first published judgment setting out the 3-stage approach on IM applications by an infant child of the deceased under IPFDO. There is no need to demonstrate an infant child’s reasonable financial needs, or that he was substantially maintained by the deceased prior to his death.
This case also sheds light on how a Winnie Lo fee arrangement sits within the Family Court context, and confirms that it is available to practitioners and lay clients. Whilst it is good news that lay clients adopting such a fee arrangement will not be jeopardized in their maintenance claim, practitioners should tackle the same with care given the associated litigation risks and Counsel fee liabilities. When used wisely, a Winnie Lo fee arrangement can not only benefit financially deprived litigants but can also provide incentive for all parties to run a litigation as reasonably as possible.
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This article first appeared in the August, 2024 issue of the Hong Kong Lawyer, the official journal of The Law Society of Hong Kong.
Written by Christie Lee, Barrister, Pantheon Chambers & Frances Tsang, Associate, Hugill & Ip
《財產繼承 ( 供養遺屬及受養人 ) 條例》下有關子女臨時贍養費的關鍵判決
2023 年 5 月，一名 14 歲男童 (A)透過其母親 (M) 作為起訴監護人，根據《財產繼承 ( 供養遺屬及受養人) 條例》(《繼承條例》)( 第 481 章)第 3(1)(v) 條，從其已故父親的遺產中申請經濟援助。於是，她根據《繼承條例》第 7 條申請臨時贍養費。
該申請是家事法庭引入新的聆案官制度後，首批審理的非正審申請之一。在該制度下，家事法庭聆案官擁有審理非正審申請的權力。任何針對其決定的上訴，將由家事法庭法官審理，上訴的性質是重新審理。
該申請最初於 2023 年 10 月 6 日被聆案官駁回，因為聆案官不同意 A 迫切需要經濟援助。當事人對這項判決提出上訴，並申請在上訴中提供進一步證據。A 在上訴中尋求以下臨時贍養費：私人住宿、家庭傭工和其他個人訟費（包括但不限於額外學費和課外活動）。
2023 年 12 月，陳振國法官審理了 A的上訴，這是針對家事法庭聆案官的首批上訴之一。
A 上訴成功，其提出進一步證據的申請獲得批准。她獲判每月 7,200 港元臨時贍養費。
上訴判決提供了以下重要見解：
《繼承條例》下適用於臨時贍養費申索的法律原則；
A 當前的財務需求和可用的財務資源；
《繼承條例》下的臨時贍養費申請應考慮未成年人的福利；及
家事法庭將如何看待盧蔚恩案的訟費安排。
《繼承條例》下適用於臨時贍養費申索的法律原則
根據法律改革委員會的建議，訂立《繼承條例》旨在取代現已廢除的《遺屬生活費條例》。它延續了《遺屬生活費條例》的精神，為未從死者遺產中獲得合理的經濟資助以維持生活的近親提供安全網。
A 根據《繼承條例》第 7 條提出臨時贍養費申索。臨時贍養費第 7(1) 條規定：
凡有人申請根據第4 條作出命令，而法院覺得—
(a) 申請人即時需要經濟援助，但法院未能決定應根據該條作出何種命令 ( 如作出命令的話 )；及
(b) 構成死者淨遺產一部分的財產可供動用或能供動用，以應付申請人的需要
則法院可命令從死者淨遺產中，撥出一筆或多筆法院認為合理的款項以付給申請人，但此等撥款須受法院所可能施加的條件或限制 ( 如有的話 ) 以及法院進一步作出的命令所規限，同時，如撥出多於一筆的款項，法院可命令須按法院認為合理的相隔時段付給；法院亦可命令在本條例的規限下付給該等款項直至法院指明的日期為止，而該日期不得遲於法院根據第 4 條作出命令之日，或法院決定不行使其在該條下的權力之日。
鑑於香港的《繼承條例》案件數量有限，《繼承條例》臨時贍養費的判例亦有限，尤其是有關死者撫養的未成年子女的判例。
在判案書第 29 段，法官藉此機會澄清了根據《繼承條例》判決臨時贍養費申索時適用的法律原則。簡而言之，這是個三階段的測試：
在該段中，臨時贍養費申請有兩個先決條件，即申請人必須有即時經濟援助需要，而遺產能夠滿足申請人的這種需要。必須滿足這兩個先決條件，法院才會考慮是否根據案件的所有情況行使其酌情權，授予此類臨時贍養費令。因此，這是個三階段的測試，即：
(1) 申請人是否有任何即時的財務需要。
(2) 如果是，遺產是否能夠滿足這些需要。
(3) 再如果是，那麼法院將考慮是否根據案件的所有情況行使其酌情權，授予此類 臨時贍養費令。
他接著確認了「即時財務需要」的定義為「需要立即採取行動的事情」，並採納了林雲浩法官在 ACLS v HSB(T)L [2013] 2 HKLRD 444 案的定義。
預計今後將採用類似的三階段測試來決定《繼承條例》下的臨時贍養費申索。
A 的即時財務需要是什麼？
法官駁回 A 提出的私人房屋及家庭傭工的訴求，理由是他們在實用性上面對挑戰。儘管如此，他認為 A 有即時的財務需要。遺產能夠滿足這些需要，這是「本法院行使酌情權，授予A 臨時贍養費命令的明確案例，唯一的問題是多少」（第 61 段）。
法官認為 A 的即時財務需要總計為9,708 港元，其中包括護理院住宿費（港幣 1,500 元）、課外活動費（港幣 2,500 元）、在外用餐（港幣 600元）、流動數據計劃（港幣 138 元）、假期消費（港幣 200 元）、學校午餐及零用錢（港幣 1,200 美元）以及其他雜費。死者生前提供給 A 的額外學費構成 A 的即時經濟需要的一部分（港幣 2,720 元）。
扣除 A 的 DSWI 戶口內可用於支付其護理院開支的剩餘資金，使 A 的即時淨財務需要減少至 8,208 港元。
A 有什麼可用的資源？
雖然 M 確實擁有一些可用的財務資源，但必須考慮整體情況。M 的薪水為 4,730 港元，伙食津貼為 1,196 港元。她每月僅花 900 港元。她要撫養大兒子，扣除自己的開銷已不夠錢撫養大兒子，不應該把資源轉移至 A身上。如果對遺產發出臨時贍養費命令，她繼續留多一點財務資源供自己使用是合理的。M 在菲律賓的土地在短期內無法出售或變現以滿足 A 的燃眉之急。考慮到整體情況，M 被命令向 A 的臨時贍養費貢獻 1,000 港元。
此外，該遺產擁有充足的流動資產，可以用來滿足 A 的即時財務需要。
答辯人同時辯稱，A 沒有即時需要，因為他可以以綜援的形式獲得公共援助，而申請人能夠聘請律師，因此他不能獲得其他資金來源。法官駁回了這個論點。
A 每月的即時財務淨需要為 8,208 港元，M 為這筆款項供款 1,000 港元是合理的。考慮到遺產的規模，法官命令遺產每月向 A 支付 7,200 港元作為臨時贍養費。
未成年人的福利
判決的結論強調了保護 A 福利的重要性（第 63 段）：
「 我必須提醒自己，我們現正處理一個未成年人的福利問題，他失去了父親的照顧和長期經濟支持。他的生活發生了翻天覆地的變化，這並不是他的錯。他被要求住在機構裡，而不是他父親在世時曾經享受過的普通家庭生活。因此，制定合理的臨時贍養費命令非常重要，盡量減少因死者死亡和經濟支持停止而對 A 造成的不利影響。」
訟費安排及盧蔚恩案
本案的一個特點是，A 沒有獲得法律援助，與大多數經濟能力有限的經濟援助申請人不同。A 的律師以盧蔚恩案為基礎收取訟費，據此他們將向答辯人尋求有利的訟費令。
這種訟費安排在 Winnie Lo v HKSAR(2012) 15 HKCFAR 16-71 案中進行了詳細討論。在該案中，被告是一名香港律師，她同意接手一宗人身傷害案件並向對方追討律師費。終審法院在判決中確認：
「事務律師同意在訴訟中不訟費或收取較低訟費，並不屬於助訟或包攬訴訟，亦不論事務律師是否同意期望對訟方頒發出有利的訟費令，以收回其普通訟費和代墊付訟費。這同樣適用於事務律師負責支付當事人的代墊付訟費，以期向對方追討有關訟費的案件，但有關的訴訟因由或抗辯必須合理，並且沒有包攬訴訟的情況。」
在本案中，答辯人稱，既然 M 能夠聘請律師參與訴訟，她一定能夠支付律師費。法官承認，在香港現行的法律框架下，按盧蔚恩案的基礎訟費是完全可以接受的。儘管 M 有律師代表出庭，但並沒有得出對 A 或 M 不利的推論。
根據《香港事務律師專業操守指引》第一冊第十二章第 12.04 條，「除非有合理辯解，否則作為一種專業行為操守規範，事務律師本身須對支付大律師的適當訟費負責。」
因此，如果執業事務律師決定以盧蔚恩案為基礎代表當事人，並在委聘大律師前沒有預先向當事人收取大律師墊支費用，則該事務律師本身將有責任支付大律師的收費。因此，大律師即使根據盧蔚恩案的收費安排而同意出庭，並不自動代表當事人必須支付大律師的訟費，也不代表當事人必須無法證明其對財政資助的要求。
盧蔚恩案與其他法律費用援助選擇
經常進出家事法庭的人一定不會對這個故事感到陌生：
在婚姻破裂或失去親人之後，受養人突然被切斷了所有經濟來源。在一個看似平靜的下午，他們被踢出家門，所有銀行帳戶和信用卡都被停用。
他們後來才意識到，自己被曾經的家人殘酷地背叛了。
由於要撫養年幼的孩子和支付帳單，他們沒有資金提起訴訟。他們被財力雄厚的對方霸凌，感到無能為力，完全任由他們擺佈。
當事人通常會發現自己處於以下情況之一：
他們會申請並獲得法律援助。他們的訴訟結果將受到法律援助第一押記影響，代表法律援助將獲得最終裁決的第一筆訟費，以支付訴訟中產生的律師費，餘額將退還給受助人。
他們無法獲得法律援助。如果幸運地找到願意在沒有足夠訟費保證的情況下啟動案件的律師事務所，他們很可能立即申請訴訟資助，要求對方為他們的訴訟提供資金。
在極少數情況下，他們也許能夠找到願意無償提供服務的律師事務所。
如果以上情況都沒有發生，他們可能會決定自己代表自己出庭。
在不詳細討論上述所有選項的利弊的情況下，我們與其他從業者分享以下觀點：
法律援助署的工作繁重。法律援助申請往往需要兩至三個月處理，在申請處理期間，對方便有機會可以採取對當事人不利的行動，且後續可能難以糾正其後果。
訴訟資助申請雖然方便，但本質上仍然有訴訟風險。它負有很高的舉證責任，而且申請人可能無法獲得足夠的訴訟資助來全面有效地進行案件。實際上，這已造成了一個不公平的局面，因為接受方不僅要依賴支付方按時付款，而且每月只能花「固定金額」去支付自己的律師費用，而支付方通常擁有更多可用資金來滿足其訴訟需求。
無償安排實質上消除了對方的潛在訟費責任，並減少了和解的動機。因此，這種安排在公法訴訟中最常見，很少適用於有爭議的婚姻和《繼承條例》事務。
同時需要補充 一 點：在離婚 訴訟中，訴訟資金申請一般使 用 Currey 測試進行定奪，現時卻沒有直接案例或典據表明 Currey測試直接適用於《繼承條例》下的臨時贍養費申請。\
此判決確認了盧蔚恩案的訟費安排不一定損害受養人提出經濟援助的申索，這為法律專業人士提供了另一個選擇，以協助真正陷入困境的申索人。
某程度上，就規劃訴訟策略而言，當事人若采用盧蔚恩案的訟費安排，相較接受訴訟資助，將受到更少的資金限制。盧蔚恩案的訟費安排將訴訟風險重新轉移給了財務上更有能力的一方，他們必須不斷注意自己潛在的訟費責任，確保採取合理的訴訟方式，並在必要時作出讓步，以免在訴訟結束時被對方追討一大筆訟費。
（當然，通過訟費評定程序能夠確保對訟費作出公平的評估。）以盧蔚恩案為基礎訟費的律師，也需要確保其當事人並非無理申索，需要有合理勝算才進行訴訟，才可以爭取有利的訟費命令。在家事法庭案件中，當事人往往情緒激動，沒有那麼理性，這可能是一個很好的工具，提醒各方合理行事，以盡可能減少不必要的衝突。
在 Ladd v London Road Car Co Times Newspaper (1900) LT Jo 80 案中，Lord Russell of Killowen LCJ 評論道：
「……在這種意義上，接手一項具有投機性質的訴訟完全符合律師職業的榮譽。如果律師得知當事人受到傷害，並誠實地了解是否存在真正的訴訟因由，那麼律師接手此案件的行為就符合專業榮譽。因為在這個國家沒有任何機制可以為下層階級伸張正義，如果沒有律師願意接手這些案件，這將是一件非常糟糕的事。法律是昂貴的奢侈品，如果沒有專業人士接手這些案件，冒最終不能獲得報酬的風險，正義很多時候將得不到伸張。但前提是律師已經真誠地仔細調查，確信案件有理有據。」
我們同意。從法律學院開始我們就被教導，人人平等地享有訴諸司法的機會是基本人權。然而，在現實世界，這是知易行難。鑒於此判決接受了在家事法庭中採用盧蔚恩案的訟費安排，我們希望這將為執業者提供更多動力，為有迫切需要幫助的人提供幫助，因為他們知道只要申索有理據，他們終將能夠從對手那裡收回訟費。
重點知識
這是首個有關死者的未成年子女根據《繼承條例》下的臨時贍養費的公開判決，為這種申請定下三階段方法，同時，申請人也無需證明未成年子女有合理財務需求，或未成年子女在死者去世前主要由死者撫養。
此案還揭示了盧蔚恩案訟費安排在家事法庭的適用情況，並確認該安排可在家事法庭裏使用。好消息是，採用這種訟費安排的當事人不會在贍養費申索中受到影響；但儘管如此，考慮到相關的訴訟風險和律師費責任，執業者始終應謹慎處理這個問題。如果運用得當，盧蔚恩案的訟費安排不僅可以使有經濟困難的訴訟當事人受益，還可以激勵各方盡可能合理地進行訴訟。
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文章最初於2024年8月份香港律師會刊登。